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Criminal Lawyers’ Assn. v. Ontario: A 
Limited Right to Government 
Information under Section 2(b)  
of the Charter 
Daniel Guttman* 
I. INTRODUCTION AND OVERVIEW 
Before the relatively recent development of federal and provincial 
access statutes, government information was not generally available to 
the public. While the emergence of access to information legislation in 
Canadian jurisdictions reflected important public policy decisions that 
providing access to information promotes good government, the courts 
had always recognized that there was no constitutional right to require 
the government to disclose information. That has now changed. In 
Criminal Lawyers’ Assn. v. Ontario (Ministry of Public Safety and Secu-
rity),1 the Supreme Court of Canada unanimously reached the novel 
conclusion that the right to freedom of information protected by section 
2(b) of the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms2 contained, in lim-
ited circumstances, a derivative right to government information. The 
new right to government information recognized by the Court is an ex-
tremely narrow right. The Court found that that limited right was not 
engaged on the facts of the Criminal Lawyers case and therefore over-
turned the majority decision of the Ontario Court of Appeal.3 That 
majority had held that provisions of the Freedom of Information and  
                                                                                                             
* Daniel Guttman is counsel at the Constitutional Law Branch, Ministry of the Attorney 
General of Ontario (seconded to the criminal law division in 2010) and was counsel at the Court of 
Appeal and the Supreme Court of Canada in Criminal Lawyers’ Assn. v. Ontario. The views set out 
in the article are his alone and are not the views of the Ministry of the Attorney General of Ontario 
or the Government of Ontario. 
1 [2010] S.C.J. No. 23, 2010 SCC 23 (S.C.C.) [hereinafter “Criminal Lawyers”]. 
2 Part I of the Constitution Act, 1982, being Schedule B to the Canada Act 1982 (U.K.), 
1982, c. 11 [hereinafter “Charter”]. 
3 [2007] O.J. No. 2038 (Ont. C.A.). 
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Protection of Privacy Act4 which allowed the Ontario government the 
discretion to refuse to disclose a police report and two solicitor-client 
privileged documents to the Criminal Lawyers’ Association (“CLA”) 
infringed the CLA’s freedom of expression.  
This paper discusses the new right to government information recog-
nized by the Supreme Court in the Criminal Lawyers case. The paper is 
broken down into seven parts. In Part II, I briefly summarize Ontario’s 
statutory scheme governing access to government-held documents. In 
Part III, I set out the facts of the Criminal Lawyers Assn. v. Ontario ap-
peal and set the framework for the discussion of the constitutional issue. 
In Part IV, I briefly describe the decisions of the courts below. In Part V, I 
provide short descriptions of the positions of the parties in the Supreme 
Court. In Part VI, I summarize the Supreme Court’s decision. In Part VII, 
I discuss the new right to government information with a focus on the 
analysis that led to the development of the right as well as its practical 
significance.  
II. ONTARIO’S FREEDOM OF INFORMATION AND  
PROTECTION OF PRIVACY ACT 
The guiding principles of Freedom of Information and Protection of 
Privacy Act are that government information should be available to the 
public and that necessary exemptions to this obligation should be limited 
and specific.5 Thus FIPPA mandates that all government records must be 
disclosed unless the government can show that the records fall within an 
enumerated exclusion or exemption in the Act. FIPPA is remedial legisla-
tion that provides a right of access where none would otherwise exist. 
FIPPA creates the Information and Privacy Commission (“IPC”) and au-
thorizes it to oversee the information request process to ensure 
independent oversight of Ontario’s response to information requests. The 
IPC has the authority to review government records (where the govern-
ment claims they fall within an exemption) to determine whether the 
records do in fact fall within an exemption. The IPC can also order parts 
of a record to be disclosed when the full record is not covered by the  
exemptions.  
                                                                                                             
4 R.S.O. 1990, c. F.31 [hereinafter “FIPPA”]. 
5 Id., s. 1. 
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Section 10 of FIPPA provides every person with a general “right of 
access to a record” or “a part of a record”.6 However, as indicated in its 
text, section 10 must be read in conjunction with sections 12 to 22, which 
provide specific exemptions to the general right of access.7 The inclusion 
of these exemptions reflects a careful balancing by the legislature of 
competing interests (i.e., giving access to government-held information 
while maintaining the ability to prevent harm from the disclosure of cer-
tain types of information). Some of the exemptions are mandatory while 
others provide the government with a discretion not to disclose.8 The ex-
emptions apply to Cabinet records; records that reveal the advice to 
government by a public servant; law enforcement records; records where 
disclosure would harm relations with other governments; defence re-
cords; records subject to solicitor-client privilege; records where 
disclosure would harm the economic interests of the government or of 
third parties or that could threaten the safety or health of someone; and 
records where disclosure would represent an unjustified invasion of per-
sonal privacy.9 
Section 23 provides for a “public interest override” for some of the 
categories of exempted records. The public interest override is premised 
on a balancing test, whereby the government must determine whether 
there is a compelling public interest in disclosure that would outweigh 
the purpose of the exemption. Section 23 does not apply to the more sen-
sitive types of government record, including law enforcement or 
solicitor-client privilege documents (the two exemptions at issue in 
Criminal Lawyers), or to Cabinet or defence records.10 
As a final safeguard of access, section 11 of FIPPA requires that, de-
spite any other provision in FIPPA, any record in the government’s 
possession which reveals a grave environmental, health or safety hazard 
must be disclosed (assuming it is in the public interest to do so).11 
                                                                                                             
6 Section 65 of FIPPA excludes certain records from the application of FIPPA and s. 67 re-
tains the confidentiality provisions of certain other statutes. 
7 Section 10 states it does not apply if the record “falls within one of the exemptions under 
sections 12 to 22”.  
8 Eleven of the 15 exemptions in FIPPA are discretionary exemptions.  
9 An opportunity is given to any person whose interests may be affected to make represen-
tations on disclosure. Section 28 sets out the procedure in detail. FIPPA, ss. 12-22.  
10 FIPPA, s. 23. 
11 FIPPA, s. 11. 
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1. The Solicitor-Client and Law Enforcement Exemptions at Issue 
in Criminal Lawyers 
As set out above, the solicitor-client and law enforcement exemp-
tions are discretionary provisions that are not subject to the section 23 
public interest override. Under the law enforcement12 exemption, the 
government may refuse to disclose a law enforcement record where inter 
alia the disclosure could reasonably be expected to interfere with law 
enforcement or an investigation, reveal investigative techniques or dis-
close a confidential source. In addition, section 14(2) of FIPPA allows 
the government to deny disclosure of a record “that is a report prepared 
in the course of law enforcement, inspections or investigations by an 
agency which has the function of enforcing and regulating compliance 
with a law”. The solicitor-client exemption (section 19) allows the gov-
ernment to refuse to disclose a record that is subject to solicitor-client 
privilege or that “was prepared by or for Crown counsel for use in giving 
legal advice” or for litigation.13 
The police records and solicitor-client exemptions were included in 
FIPPA on the basis of the report of the Williams Commission,14 which 
recognized that in order to ensure effective government, confidentiality 
in certain areas, including law enforcement and solicitor-client privilege, 
was required. 
A proposal to make these exemptions subject to the public interest 
override (i.e., section 23) was expressly considered and rejected by the 
legislature.15 In speaking against the proposed amendment, Ian Scott 
(then Attorney General) described the two main reasons for excluding 
these exemptions from the public interest override as follows:  
(1) the Commissioner would not be aware of or able to take into 
account the complex consequences of releasing to the public a record 
that contains law enforcement information; and  
                                                                                                             
12 “Law enforcement” is defined in s. 2 as policing or an investigation/inspection leading to 
a hearing with penalties. 
13 FIPPA, ss. 14, 19. 
14 Public Government for Private People: The Report of the Commission on Freedom of Informa-
tion and Individual Privacy (Toronto: Queen’s Printer, 1980) [hereinafter “Williams Commission”].  
15 Bill 34 (the bill that eventually became FIPPA) was introduced in the Legislature on July 
12, 1985.  
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(2) solicitor-client privilege held by government should not be 
abrogated by the Commissioner.16 
III. THE CRIMINAL LAWYERS’ ASSOCIATION’S  
REQUEST FOR INFORMATION  
The case of Criminal Lawyers involved a request of information by 
the CLA for a report into the failed murder prosecution of Graham Court 
and Peter Monaghan. The prosecution was stayed in 1997 by Glithero J. 
primarily on the basis that adequate disclosure had not been provided and 
because the police had lost evidence.17 
Not surprisingly, a great deal of media attention was given to the stay 
of this high-profile murder case. Justice Glithero’s ruling led to an inde-
pendent Ontario Provincial Police (“OPP”) investigation into the conduct 
of the Hamilton police and the Crown attorneys involved in that prosecu-
tion. The OPP investigation concluded that although evidence had been 
lost and inadequate disclosure made, there was no basis to charge either 
the police or the Crown with obstructing justice. On April 3, 1998, the 
OPP briefly explained its conclusion in a short news release: 
The investigation into the missing audiotape found no evidence that the 
officers attempted to obstruct justice by destroying or withholding a 
vital piece of evidence. The investigation also found no evidence that 
information withheld from defence was done deliberately and with the 
intent to obstruct justice.  
In a Hamilton Spectator article 10 days later, the Criminal Lawyers’ 
Association set out their disagreement with the OPP’s conclusion. 
In an interview, Detective Inspector Mike Coughlin, the OPP probe’s 
lead investigator, concurred with Glithero J.’s finding that the police offi-
cers and the Crown failed to provide all the evidence to the defence and 
that the real issue was the reason behind the non-disclosure. Neverthe-
less, Coughlin was of the view that although the non-disclosure could be 
due to a number of problems in police communication and procedure, 
there was no intention to pervert justice, nor was there any commission 
                                                                                                             
16 Ontario, Legislative Assembly, Official Report of Debates (Hansard), 23 (June 8, 1987), 
at 1168 (Hon. Mr. Scott), 1169 (Hon. Mr. Scott & Mr. Sterling), 1171 (Hon. Mr. Scott). See also 
Ontario, Legislative Assembly, Standing Committee on the Legislative Assembly, M-67 (March 23, 
1987) at M-9-M-10 (Hon. Mr. Scott), M-11 (Hon. Mr. Scott & Ms. Gigantes), M-20 (Hon. Mr. Scott 
& Ms. Gigantes); Williams Commission, supra, note 14, at 294-95, and 338-39.  
17 R. v. Court, [1997] O.J. No. 3450, 36 O.R. (3d) 263 (Ont. Gen. Div.). 
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of crime. More importantly, Coughlin questioned the appropriateness of 
Glithero J.’s use of 1990s disclosure law to decide a case that occurred in 
the 1980s when disclosure policies and practices were less stringent.18 
Following the OPP press release, the CLA submitted an access to in-
formation request under the FIPPA, seeking access to the records 
underlying the OPP’s investigation. In response to this request, the gov-
ernment identified a number of responsive documents. However, the 
government indicated, pursuant to the law enforcement (section 14), so-
licitor-client privilege (section 19) and personal privacy (section 21) 
exemptions, that it would not disclose a number of documents. These 
documents included the 318-page police report produced in the 1998 in-
vestigation,19 a 1998 memorandum and a March 24, 1998 letter. In 
response, the CLA appealed to the IPC, arguing that sections 14 and 19 
of FIPPA unjustifiably infringed the CLA’s freedom of expression.  
IV. THE LOWER COURT DECISIONS  
The CLA’s appeal to the Assistant Information and Privacy Commis-
sioner was dismissed. The Assistant Commissioner agreed that the 
records were exempt under sections 14, 19 and 21 and thus upheld the 
decision not to disclose. He applied section 23 and concluded that the 
public interest in disclosure outweighed the interest in non-disclosure 
under the personal privacy exception in section 21. However, since sec-
tions 14 and 19 were not subject to the section 23 “public interest 
override”, he did not order disclosure of the records. He rejected the 
CLA’s claim that the denial of access to the records in question violated 
section 2(b) of the Charter or the unwritten constitutional principle of 
democracy.20  
The CLA applied to the Divisional Court for judicial review. The  
Divisional Court dismissed that application,21 explaining that “stripped to 
its essentials”, the applicant’s position was that: 
                                                                                                             
18 Nancy DeHart, “MP Wants Review of OPP Probe: Racco Inquiry Criticized”, Hamilton 
Spectator, April 13, 1998, at A1. 
19 The bulk of the report contains transcripts of the interviews conducted with the six per-
sons subject to the investigation and five witnesses. The investigation included a review of the files 
of the Police Services and Crown attorney at issue, and interviews with members of these police 
services and the Attorney General as to their roles and responsibilities in relation to the criminal 
proceeding. 
20 Order PO-1779 of the Assistant Information and Privacy Commissioner (May 5, 2000). 
21 Criminal Lawyers’ Assn. v. Ontario (Ministry of Public Safety and Security), [2004] O.J. 
No. 1214, 70 O.R. (3d) 332 (Ont. Div. Ct.), affd [2007] O.J. No. 2038, 86 O.R. (3d) 259 (Ont. C.A.), 
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… the public [has] a general constitutional right — founded upon the s. 
2(b) freedom of expression and the unwritten constitutional principle of 
democracy — to have access to government-held information and 
documentation, and to comment thereon, unless a balancing exercise, 
conducted on a case by case basis, demonstrates that what is in the 
public interest favours non-disclosure.22 
The Court considered the various strands of jurisprudence relied on 
by the CLA concerning (1) access to public facilities; (2) the “open 
courts” principle; and (3) freedom of expression under international legal 
instruments, and concluded that there was no constitutional right to gov-
ernment-held information. The CLA appealed to the Ontario Court of 
Appeal. 
A majority of the Court of Appeal allowed the CLA’s appeal from the 
Divisional Court. In a surprising decision, the majority concluded that 
the combined operation of sections 10, 14, 19 and 23 of FIPPA infringed 
section 2(b) and was not justified under section 1. The majority’s holding 
was not made on any basis advanced by the CLA. Rather, the majority 
held that they did not need to decide whether section 2(b) includes a 
positive right to compel the disclosure of non-public government-held 
information because the Act provides a statutory right of access (section 
10) and limits on that statutory right should be considered government 
interference with that right.23  
Having concluded that it did not need to decide whether there is a 
positive right to compel government to disclose information, the majority 
went on to find that (1) the CLA’s desire to comment on apparent dis-
crepancies between Glithero J.’s decision and the OPP press release was 
“expressive activity” for the purposes of section 2(b); (2) sections 14 and 
19 have as their purpose and effect “to directly restrict the public’s ability 
to comment on those records”; and (3) the section 2(b) infringement was 
not justified under section 1. It held that there was no need to consider 
the CLA’s other argument — that FIPPA infringed the constitutional 
principle of democracy — given its decision regarding section 2(b), and 
that in any event that analysis would be duplicative of the section 2(b) 
analysis. As a remedy, the majority read sections 14 and 19 into section 
23, making those exemptions subject to the public interest override and 
                                                                                                             
revd [2010] S.C.J. No. 23, 2010 SCC 23. The Divisional Court bench was composed of Blair R.S.J. 
(as he then was), Gravely J. and Epstein J. (as she then was). 
22 Id., at para. 32 (Div. Ct.). 
23 Court of Appeal, supra, note 3, at paras. 37-39. 
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sent the matter back to the IPC to consider whether section 23 applied in 
the circumstances of this case.24 
Justice Juriansz dissented, concluding that there was no violation of 
section 2(b). He directly considered the CLA’s assertion that section 2(b) 
included a positive right to compel government to disclose information in 
its possession, and concluded, after reviewing the applicable jurispru-
dence, that it did not. He also disagreed with the majority’s conclusions 
that section 23 limits freedom of expression in purpose or effect.25 In his 
view: 
• The CLA was able to comment extensively on the OPP investigation. 
Its further “desire to comment”, or its “potential comments” on the 
OPP report have not yet occurred and are not “expressive activity” 
within the meaning of section 2(b). 
• Section 2(b) does not mandate positive action by government to pro-
vide information in its control to a person so as to ameliorate that 
person’s ability to express themselves. Here, “the extent to which 
positive government action may, in exceptional cases, be required to 
secure freedom of expression falls well short of the bold contention 
… that the right to access government information is, structurally, a 
component of the s. 2(b) guarantee”.  
• Given the careful and consistent distinction the Charter makes be-
tween freedoms and rights, principles of constitutional interpretation 
cannot support a finding “that s. 2(b), which guarantees a freedom, has 
a right grafted onto it as an unexpressed component of that freedom”. 
This is especially so given the history of the drafting of section 2(b). 
“It would be a “very big step” for the courts to interpret the Charter as 
guaranteeing a right of access to government information when such a 
right was proposed, considered and rejected by Canada’s parliamen-
tary representatives. 
• While international law instruments can be considered in Charter 
interpretation, consideration of these documents does not require the 
court to read a right to access government information into section 
2(b). “Neither it nor the decisions of courts and tribunals of other 
countries or international organizations can overcome the dominating 
weight of the other considerations reviewed above. Section 2(b) must 
                                                                                                             
24 Id., per LaForme J.A.’s majority decision at paras. 30, 49, 64, 97. 
25 Id., dissent of Juriansz J.A., at paras. 106-122, 135, 137, 153 and 168-172. 
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be interpreted in the linguistic, philosophic and historical context of 
its adoption by Canada.” 
• The majority’s argument fails to appreciate that the right to access 
information under FIPPA “is strictly a creation of legislation”. “The 
legislature is free to dictate the conditions and limitations on that 
right, provided it does not do so in a discriminatory manner.” The 
majority failed to read the Act as a whole and failed to recognize its 
different purposes. The majority’s failure to properly interpret the 
statement of purpose in section 1 of the Act and the principle that 
there will be “necessary exemptions”, which “should be limited and 
specific” led them to erroneously find that the only aim of the Act is 
to provide access to government information, and that any limits 
within the Act detract from the purpose. Thus, the majority’s finding 
that section 23 restricts freedom of expression because it restricts the 
statutory right in section 10 is an error which goes to the core of its 
constitutional analysis — “it is not appropriate to pit one part of a 
statute against another, first to find an underlying statutory right and 
then to find the negation of that right”. 
• The majority’s remedy is an inappropriate use of “reading in”.26 
1. Proceedings at the Supreme Court of Canada 
Leave to appeal to the Supreme Court was granted on February 14, 
2008. The Chief Justice of Canada stated the following constitutional 
questions:  
1. Does s. 23 of [FIPPA] infringe s. 2(b) of [the Charter] by failing to 
extend the public interest override to the exemptions found in ss. 
14 and 19 of the Act? 
2. If so, is the infringement a reasonable limit prescribed by law as 
can be demonstrably justified in a free and democratic society 
under s. 1 [of the Charter]? 
3. Does s. 23 of [FIPPA] offend the constitutional principle of 
democracy? 27 
Oral arguments were heard in the Supreme Court of Canada, and 
judgment was reserved on December 11, 2008.  
                                                                                                             
26 Id., at para. 153. 
27 [2007] S.C.C.A. No. 382 (S.C.C.). 
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V. POSITIONS OF THE PARTIES AT THE SUPREME COURT  
1. Ontario’s Position 
As discussed above, a majority of the Court of Appeal found that the 
provisions of FIPPA giving the government discretion to refuse to dis-
close the police report and solicitor-client privileged documents violated 
the CLA’s freedom of expression. In the Supreme Court, Ontario took the 
position that the majority’s decision — in effect, that section 2(b) of the 
Charter includes a positive right to compel the disclosure of government-
held documents that have traditionally been closed to the public (includ-
ing documents that contain sensitive personal information, e.g., health 
records) — represented a profound departure from the existing jurispru-
dence. Ontario argued, as Juriansz J.A. recognized in the Court of 
Appeal, that the majority’s decision failed to accord any weight to “the 
distinction between a freedom and a right” made in section 2(b), which 
“remains a central feature of the Charter”. Moreover, it ran counter to the 
Supreme Court’s clear holding that restricted access to many aspects of 
government “is part of our history and our constitutional tradition” and 
“the Canadian Charter was not intended to turn this state of affairs on its 
head”.28 
Ontario also argued that the effective result of the Court of Appeal’s 
interpretation of section 2(b) was to read into the Charter an entirely new 
and distinct right — a “right to government held information”. This was 
despite the fact that the framers of the Charter expressly considered and 
rejected by formal vote the inclusion of a right to information in the 
Charter.29 
Ontario further submitted that Juriansz J.A.’s dissent correctly identi-
fied the flaws in the majority’s position; in particular, that: 
a) The majority’s decision represented a significant and unwarranted 
expansion of s. 2(b) of the Charter by reading into it a new distinct 
right to government information, which would considerably alter the 
functioning of government. 
                                                                                                             
28 Id., at para. 112; Montreal (City) v. 2952-1366 Quebec Inc., [2005] S.C.J. No. 63, [2005] 
3 S.C.R. 141, at para. 79 (S.C.C.) [hereinafter “City of Montreal”]. 
29 Minutes of Proceedings and Evidence of the Special Joint Committee of the Senate and 
of the House of Commons on the Constitution of Canada, 43 (January 22, 1981), at 101 (Mr. 
McGrath), 101, 105-106, 116 (General Debate), (“Minutes of the Special Joint Committee on the 
Constitution”). 
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b) The fact that the legislature chose to enact positive measures 
providing access to certain information in FIPPA does not mean that 
limits on that statutory right are somehow transformed into a “gag” that 
engages s. 2(b) and therefore must be justified under s. 1 of the 
Charter.30 
Ontario noted that after the Court of Appeal’s decision was rendered, 
the Supreme Court reaffirmed its previous jurisprudence that it will only 
be in the rarest of circumstances that section 2(b) will support a claim for 
positive government action.31 Ontario emphasized that the Criminal 
Lawyers case did not involve any impairment of the CLA’s freedom of 
expression (let alone satisfying the “substantial impairment of a free-
dom” requirement set out by the court in Dunmore v. Ontario32) and was 
not, in any way, an exceptional case that would support a finding that 
section 2(b) required the positive government action requested by the 
CLA. 
2. The CLA’s Position 
In the Supreme Court of Canada proceedings, the CLA relied little 
on the decision of the majority of the Court of Appeal. Rather, they ar-
gued the novel proposition that, contrary to Juriansz J.A.’s dissent, 
section 2(b) of the Charter includes a positive right to compel the disclo-
sure of government-held documents that have traditionally been closed to 
the public. 
VI. THE DECISION OF THE SUPREME COURT OF CANADA 
The Supreme Court of Canada’s judgment was issued on June 17, 
2010, 18 months after it was argued. The unanimous decision of the 
Court,33 written by Chief Justice McLachlin and Justice Abella, allowed 
the appeal and affirmed the validity of section 23 of FIPPA.  
                                                                                                             
30 FIPPA, supra, note 4, ss. 10, 14, 19, 23; Court of Appeal, supra, note 3, Juriansz J.A., in 
dissent, at paras. 117-119, 137. 
31 Baier v. Alberta, [2007] S.C.J. No. 31, [2007] 2 S.C.R. 673 (S.C.C.) [hereinafter 
“Baier”]. 
32 [2001] S.C.J. No. 87, [2001] 3 S.C.R. 1016 (S.C.C.) [hereinafter “Dunmore”]. 
33 The panel consisted of seven judges as Bastarache J. had recently retired (Deschamps J. 
did not sit on the case). 
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1. Overview of the Decision 
The Supreme Court reversed the majority of the Ontario Court of 
Appeal and upheld the constitutional validity of section 23 of FIPPA, 
finding that there was no breach of the CLA’s section 2(b) right to free-
dom of expression. The Court went on to confirm that those documents 
sought by the CLA that fell under section 19 were exempted from disclo-
sure. The claim for the 318-page police report was returned to the 
Information Commissioner for reconsideration on the question of 
whether the government properly exercised its discretion when it decided 
to refuse disclosure of the report.  
2. Section 2(b) and the Right to Government Information 
The Supreme Court accepted Ontario’s argument that there was no 
general right under section 2(b) to obtain government documents. The 
court recognized that section 2(b) “guarantees freedom of expression, not 
access to information”.34 However, they found that “access is a derivative 
right which may arise where it is a necessary precondition of meaningful 
expression on the functioning of government”.35 Thus the Court created a 
new right, albeit an extremely narrow one, to government information 
under section 2(b). The Court found that section 2(b) “includes a right to 
access to documents only where access is necessary to permit meaningful 
discussion on a matter of public importance, subject to privileges and 
functional constraints”.36 
The Court came to this test by reformulating the three-step Irwin 
Toy37/City of Montreal38 test for expressive activity to apply to a request 
for information. The three-step test for the new right to government in-
formation as developed by the Supreme Court is as follows: 
(1) Is access necessary to permit meaningful discussion on a matter of 
public importance? 
                                                                                                             
34 S.C.C. decision, supra, note 1, at para. 30. 
35 Id., at para. 30. 
36 Id., at para. 31. 
37 Irwin Toy Ltd. v. Quebec (Attorney General), [1989] S.C.J. No. 36, [1989] 1 S.C.R. 927 
(S.C.C.) [hereinafter “Irwin Toy”]. 
38 Supra, note 28. 
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(2) If (1) is satisfied, is section 2(b) protection nevertheless removed 
because requiring access to the documents would impair a privilege 
or the functioning of the affected government institution? 
(3) If (1) and (2) are satisfied, section 2(b) is engaged. However, section 
2(b) is only breached if it can be shown that the state has infringed 
that protection.39 
The first and third components are essentially the first and third 
components of the Irwin Toy/City of Montreal test. The second step of 
the new test is a specific application of the more general second step of 
Irwin Toy/City of Montreal test.40 
3. Application of the New Criminal Lawyers test to the Court and 
Monaghan affair 
Applying this test, the Court found that the new section 2(b) right to 
government information was not engaged or infringed on the facts of this 
case as none of the steps were satisfied. First, the Court concluded that 
the CLA had failed to establish that the information sought from the gov-
ernment was “necessary for meaningful public discussion of the 
problems in the administration of justice relating to the Racco murder”, 
noting that already, “much is known about these events”.41 Second, the 
Court found that even if the documents were necessary for the CLA to 
express itself meaningfully on this issue, section 2(b) was not engaged as 
the CLA had not established that “access to ss. 14 and 19 documents, 
obtained through the s. 23 override, would not impinge on privileges or 
impair the functioning of relevant government institutions”.42 Finally, the 
Court found that even if “s. 2(b) were engaged, it would not be 
breached” as the request of the CLA to have sections 14 and 19 read into 
section 23 would have little impact on the CLA’s ability to comment fur-
ther. The Court explained as follows:  
The ultimate answer to the CLA’s claim is that the absence of the 
second-stage review, provided by the s. 23 override for documents 
within ss. 14 and 19, does not significantly impair any hypothetical 
right to access government documents, given that those sections, 
                                                                                                             
39 Supra, note 1, at para. 33. 
40 The second step of the Irwin Toy Ltd./City of Montreal test asks whether there is some-
thing in the method or location of that expression that would remove the protection. 
41 S.C.C. decision, supra, note 1, at para. 59. 
42 Id., at para. 60. 
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properly interpreted, already incorporate consideration of the public 
interest. The CLA would not meet the test because it could not show 
that the state has infringed its rights to freedom of expression.43  
4. The Court’s Direction on the Exercise of Discretion under 
FIPPA 
The Court confirmed that discretionary decisions made under FIPPA 
must conform to the well-accepted standard set out in Baker v. Canada 
— namely, that “discretion conferred by statute must be exercised consis-
tently with the purposes underlying its grant”.44 Thus, in order to 
properly exercise disclosure, a Minister or a “head” must weigh the con-
sideration for and against disclosure, including the public interest in 
disclosure. The Court specifically directed that the purpose of the exemp-
tion at issue and all other relevant interests should be considered when a 
“head” is deciding whether or not to exercise the discretion to disclose. 
By way of illustration, the Court offered specific direction to a head mak-
ing a decision under section 14. Section 14 requires the head consider 
“whether a compelling public interest in disclosure outweighs the pur-
pose of the exemption, to prevent interference with law enforcement”.45 
Where a head finds that such an interest exists, the document should be 
disclosed. 
The Court also confirmed that a discretionary decision to refuse to 
disclose a document is reviewable by the IPC and subsequently through 
judicial review of the IPC decision. While the IPC may not substitute its 
decision for the decision of the “head”, it may ask the “head” or Minister 
to reconsider the decision where it appears to be exercised inappropri-
ately (e.g., where the decision appears to have been made in bad faith, 
“took into account irrelevant considerations; or, … failed to take into  
account relevant considerations”).46 
While the CLA had not challenged, at any level of court, the exercise 
of the Minister’s discretion, the Court directed that the claim for the 318-
page police report be returned to the Information Commissioner for re-
consideration on the question of whether the government properly 
exercised its discretion when refusing to disclose the report. With respect 
to the documents sought by the CLA that fell under the solicitor-client 
                                                                                                             
43 Id., at para. 61. 
44 Id., at para. 46. 
45 Id., at para. 49. 
46 Id., at para. 71. 
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exemption in section 19, the Court viewed the matter very differently, 
due to the categorical nature of solicitor-client privilege and the estab-
lished case law affirming that solicitor-client privilege does not involve a 
balancing of interests on a case-by-case basis.47  
5. The Unwritten Constitutional Principle of Democracy 
Given its finding that section 2(b) contained a right to information, 
the Supreme Court did not consider the CLA’s similar challenge based on 
the unwritten constitutional principle of democracy.  
VII. ANALYSIS OF THE SUPREME COURT DECISION 
The decision in Criminal Lawyers is significant on many levels. The 
following looks at three important aspects of the decision: 
(1) the rejection of the traditional view that there is no right to informa-
tion in section 2(b) of the Charter; 
(2) the strict limits set on the new right to government information; and 
(3) two specific doctrinal contributions made by Criminal Lawyers to 
the section 2(b) jurisprudence, namely: 
(a) the Court’s conclusion that the first prong of the Irwin Toy test 
could theoretically be met by a denial to disclose information; 
and 
(b) the decision of the Court that the framework for analysis for a 
request for information is not the Dunmore/Baier test for posi-
tive state action but the Irwin Toy/City of Montreal test. 
1. The Rejection of the Traditional View that Section 2(b) Does Not 
Include Any Right to Government Information  
At the Supreme Court, Ontario argued (ultimately without complete 
success) that the traditional view that there is no section 2(b) right to 
                                                                                                             
47 The Court chose not to comment on Ontario’s submission that the IPC had found that the 
318-page report fell not only into the law enforcement exemption but also into the solicitor-client 
privilege exemption.  
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compel government to disclose information is supported by a number of 
strong grounds, including: 
(1) the “linguistic, philosophic and historical context of the adoption” of 
section 2(b), including its express exclusion from the Charter and the 
absence of its historical protection; 
(2) the jurisprudence that recognizes that section 2(b) operates as a 
shield and not a sword except in very rare circumstances; and 
(3) the jurisprudence that recognizes that maintaining privacy for many 
government functions is consistent with section 2(b). 
In Criminal Lawyers, while the Court did not accept these grounds as 
a basis for rejecting a derivative right to information in section 2(b), the 
strict limits imposed on the right suggest that these grounds were taken 
into consideration by the Court. Each of these grounds is examined below. 
(a) The Linguistic, Philosophic and Historical Context of the Adoption 
of Section 2(b) 
The bedrock principle of Charter interpretation is that each section of 
the Charter should be interpreted in its linguistic, philosophic and his-
torical context. As examined below in detail, Ontario argued that after 
properly interpreting the freedom of expression protected by section 2(b) 
(by looking at its linguistic, philosophic and historical context), it is clear 
that that freedom did not include a right, no matter how limited, to free-
dom of information.  
(i) Linguistic and Philosophic 
The absence of language in the Charter providing a right to informa-
tion was deliberate. The Special Committee of the House of Commons 
and Senate on the Constitution of Canada expressly considered and, in a 
formal vote, rejected a proposal to add a qualified “right to information” 
into the Charter.48 The language of the proposed addition, which was to 
be incorporated as “new section 5” of the Charter, was as follows: 
 
 
                                                                                                             
48 Minutes of the Special Joint Committee on the Constitution, supra, note 29, at 101 (Mr. 
McGrath), 101, 105-106, 116 (General Debate).  
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Right to information 
 5. Everyone has the right to have reasonable access to information 
under the control of any institution of any government.  
The federal government concluded that a statutory rather than consti-
tutional right of access was preferable because information access raises 
complex questions involving competing interests:  
We think this is the proper approach to take … [governments] taking 
their responsibilities to establish proper rules and proper procedures for 
giving citizens access to information. Just to look at this [tabled federal 
access to information legislation], how complex and thick it is, 
illustrates the kind of problem that the proponents of this amendment 
would be giving to the courts of our country — a citizen, if we 
abandoned the legislative approach and turned to a judicial 
determination, a citizen would go to court wanting a document, say, 
that touches national security, and the judge on the bench would have 
either to write this book from scratch without the benefit of a 
committee like the Justice Committee which could call witnesses and 
hear evidence and hear from officials and come up with a decision 
which relates only to the document that he is being asked to give access 
to.49  
The proposal to constitutionalize a right to information was subse-
quently expressly rejected in a formal vote. Ontario argued that 
significant weight should be accorded to that decision.50 While the Su-
preme Court explicitly recognized the fact that a right to information was 
rejected by the founders, it placed little emphasis on that fact, and did not 
feel the need to explain how a right that had been rejected could be im-
puted into section 2(b) or to cite case law on this issue such as Irwin Toy 
or R. v. Prosper.  
(ii) Historical 
It is well accepted that the interpretation of a Charter right should 
take into account the “historical origins of the concepts enshrined”. In 
                                                                                                             
49 Id., at 105. 
50 R. v. Prosper, [1994] S.C.J. No. 72, [1994] 3 S.C.R. 236, at 266-67 (S.C.C.); Irwin Toy, 
supra, note 37, at 1003; R. v. Ferguson, [2008] S.C.J. No. 6, [2008] 1 S.C.R. 96, at paras. 63-66 
(S.C.C.); R. v. Blais, [2003] S.C.J. No. 44, [2003] 2 S.C.R. 236, at paras. 39-41 (S.C.C.); R. v. Hape, 
[2007] S.C.J. No. 26, [2007] 2 S.C.R. 292, at para. 33 (S.C.C.); Court of Appeal, supra, note 3, 
dissent, at paras. 113-119. 
216 SUPREME COURT LAW REVIEW (2010), 51 S.C.L.R. (2d) 
this regard, Ontario argued that there is no historical legal right to infor-
mation held by government either at common law or otherwise.  
As La Forest J. recognized in 1997 in Dagg v. Canada (Minister of 
Finance), the “idea that members of the public should have an enforce-
able right to gain access to government held information … is relatively 
novel”. Similarly, in Fineberg v. Ontario, in which the Ontario Divisional 
Court rejected a section 2(b) challenge to FIPPA nearly identical to the 
one advanced in Criminal Lawyers, it was observed that “there is no his-
tory of unfettered public access to all information controlled by 
government akin to our almost unqualified tradition of open courts”. As 
recognized by the dissent in the Ontario Court of Appeal in the Criminal 
Lawyers case, access to information enjoys no such historical position: 
“[It] is not part of the baseline. It is a right that did not exist until the Act 
was enacted.” Ontario argued that while legislators have recognized the 
salutary policy objectives behind access to information legislation, the 
passage of such legislation is a matter of policy, not a reflection of any 
tradition of a fundamental right to be provided with government informa-
tion.51 Ontario argued that there being no historical right to compel the 
disclosure of government held information (outside of specific contexts 
such as litigation where the use that can be made of that information is 
limited by the implied undertaking rule), the only source of the right and 
the limits of its scope are statutory, not constitutional.52  
Ontario also demonstrated that the lack of a historical right was not 
unique to Canada. The U.S. Supreme Court has repeatedly held that the 
First Amendment right to freedom of speech does not include a right to 
access government information outside of the courtroom. In 1978, in 
Houchins v. KQED Inc., the majority of the Supreme Court rejected the 
argument that the First Amendment right to freedom of speech requires 
access by an individual to government information.53 The majority held 
that refusing a broadcaster permission to inspect and photograph a 
county jail where a prisoner had committed suicide did not violate the 
First Amendment:  
                                                                                                             
51 R. v. Big M Drug Mart, [1985] S.C.J. No. 17, [1985] 1 S.C.R. 295, at 343-44 (S.C.C.); 
Dagg v. Canada (Minister of Finance), [1997] S.C.J. No. 63, [1997] 2 S.C.R. 403, at para. 59 
(S.C.C.); Ontario (Attorney General) v. Fineberg, [1994] O.J. No. 1419, at 6-7 (Ont. Div. Ct.); 
McAuliffe v. Metropolitan Toronto Board of Commissioners of Police, [1975] O.J. No. 2432, 9 O.R. 
(2d) 583, at paras. 17-19 (Ont. C.A.); Canadian Newspapers Co. v. Manitoba, [1986] M.J. No. 101, 
at 4-5 (Man. C.A.). 
52 Williams Commission, supra, note 14, at para. 134; Court of Appeal, supra, note 3, dis-
sent, at paras. 117-119; Juman v. Doucette, [2008] S.C.J. No. 8, [2008] 1 S.C.R. 157 (S.C.C.). 
53 Houchins v. KQED Inc., 438 U.S. 1 (1978), at 14-15.  
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The Constitution itself is neither a Freedom of Information Act nor an 
Official Secrets Act ... Neither the First Amendment nor the Fourteenth 
Amendment mandates a right of access to government information or 
sources of information within the government’s control.54 
In 1999, in Los Angeles Police Department v. United Reporting Pub-
lishing Corp., the U.S. Supreme Court again confirmed that the First 
Amendment does not protect a right to access government information 
outside the courtroom:  
This is not a case in which the government is prohibiting a speaker from 
conveying information that the speaker already possesses. See Rubin v. 
Coors Brewing Co., 514 U.S. 476 (1995). The California statute in 
question merely requires that if respondent wishes to obtain the addresses 
of arrestees it must qualify under the statute to do so. The Respondent did 
not attempt to qualify and was therefore denied access to the addresses. 
For purposes of assessing the propriety of a facial invalidation, what we 
have before us is nothing more than a government denial of access to 
information in its possession. California could decide not to give out 
arrestee information at all without violating the First Amendment. …55 
(b) The Well-Established Principle that Section 2(b) Operates as a 
Shield and Not a Sword 
It is well accepted that section 2(b) “generally imposes a negative 
obligation on government rather than a positive obligation of protection 
or assistance”. As stated colourfully in Haig: “The traditional view, in 
colloquial terms, is that the freedom of expression contained in s. 2(b) 
prohibits gags, but does not compel the distribution of megaphones.”56 
Thus, absent “exceptional circumstances”, these cases established that 
section 2 is restricted to protecting against government interference in the 
exercise of the section 2 freedoms.  
                                                                                                             
54 In Houchins, id., at 16, the concurring opinion of Stewart J. expressed the same position:  
The First and Fourteenth Amendments do not guarantee the public a right of access to in-
formation generated or controlled by the government, nor do they guarantee the press any 
basic right of access superior to that of the public generally. The Constitution does no 
more than assure the public and the press equal access once government has opened its 
doors. 
55 Los Angeles Police Department v. United Reporting Publishing Corp., 528 U.S. 32 
(1999), per Rehnquist C.J., at 40, per Stevens and Kennedy JJ. (emphasis added). 
56 Haig v. Canada (Chief Electoral Officer), [1993] S.C.J. No. 84, [1993] 2 S.C.R. 995, at 
1035 (S.C.C.), per L’Heureux-Dubé J. [hereinafter “Haig”]. 
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The Supreme Court developed this proposition in three important 
section 2(b) decisions. As examined briefly below, these cases make it 
clear that there is no general section 2 Charter right to compel the gov-
ernment to assist in making expression maximally effective. The cases 
reflect the sound reasons, including respecting the differing roles of 
courts and legislatures, for courts to refuse to constitutionally impose 
positive duties on government absent exceptional circumstances or ex-
press constitutional language imposing positive duties (e.g., Charter, 
section 23).  
In the first case, Haig v. Canada, the Supreme Court concluded that 
section 2(b) does not include a positive right to be provided access to a 
referendum as a means of expression, stating as follows:  
The Court is being asked to find that this statutorily created platform 
for expression has taken on constitutional status. In my view, though a 
referendum is undoubtedly a platform for expression, s. 2(b) of the 
Charter does not impose upon a government, whether provincial or 
federal, any positive obligation to consult its citizens through the 
particular mechanism of a referendum. Nor does it confer upon all 
citizens the right to express their opinions in a referendum. A 
government is under no constitutional obligation to extend this 
platform of expression to anyone, let alone to everyone. A referendum 
as a platform of expression is, in my view, a matter of legislative policy 
and not of constitutional law.57  
Haig was followed shortly after by Native Women’s Assn. of Canada 
v. Canada. In that case the Supreme Court held that section 2(b) did not 
impose a positive duty on the government to provide funding to the  
Native Women’s Association of Canada to enable it to participate in a 
constitutional conference organized by the government. The Court again 
explained that “[t]he freedom of expression guaranteed by s. 2(b) of the 
Charter does not guarantee any particular means of expression or place a 
positive obligation upon the Government.”58 In Delisle v. Canada, the 
Supreme Court held that section 2(b) did not require that the government 
provide Royal Canadian Mounted Police officers with access to union 
                                                                                                             
57 Id., at 1041. 
58 Native Women’s Assn. of Canada v. Canada, [1994] S.C.J. No. 93, [1994] 3 S.C.R. 627, 
at 663 (S.C.C.). Justice McLachlin (as she then was) wrote a one-paragraph concurring judgment in 
which she dismissed the challenge on the basis that neither s. 2 nor the Charter in general required 
the government to consult with anyone in developing policy.  
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membership to facilitate expression.59 The Court explained that “[i]t is 
because of the very nature of freedom that s. 2 generally imposes a nega-
tive obligation on the government and not a positive obligation of 
protection or assistance.”60 The Court stated that it would require “excep-
tional circumstances” to depart from the ordinary rule that “freedom of 
expression imposes only an obligation that Parliament not interfere”.61 
(c) The Charter Must Be Read to Respect the Fact that Many Govern-
ment Functions Require Privacy  
Ontario also relied on the important principle that many government 
functions require privacy, a principle which was highlighted in 2005 in 
the Supreme Court decision of City of Montreal. In that case, the Su-
preme Court made clear that section 2(b) does not mandate that every 
government-owned space is available to be used for purposes of expres-
sion. Rather, in determining whether there is Charter protection in a 
particular case, the court must consider the historical or actual function 
of a place, and whether the space requires privacy and limited access: 
Many government functions, from cabinet meetings to minor clerical 
functions, require privacy. To extend a right of free expression to such 
venues might well undermine democracy and efficient governance.62  
The Supreme Court went on to adopt a test that recognized “the real-
ity that some places must remain outside the protected sphere of s. 2(b)”:  
People must know where they can and cannot express themselves and 
governments should not be required to justify every exclusion or 
regulation of expression under s. 1. As six of seven judges of this Court 
agreed in Committee for the Commonwealth of Canada, the test must 
provide a preliminary screening process. Otherwise, uncertainty will 
prevail and governments will be continually forced to justify 
restrictions which, viewed from the perspective of history and common 
sense, are entirely appropriate. Restricted access to many government-
owned venues is part of our history and our constitutional tradition. 
                                                                                                             
59 Delisle v. Canada (Deputy Attorney General), [1999] S.C.J. No. 43, [1999] 2 S.C.R. 989 
(S.C.C.). The main challenge was based on s. 2(d). 
60 Id., at para. 26. 
61 Id., at para. 38. 
62 City of Montreal, supra, note 28, at paras. 71 and 76. 
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The Canadian Charter was not intended to turn this state of affairs on 
its head.63  
The “open courts” cases also indicate that the scope of section 2(b) 
should be defined in a manner consistent with the reality that some gov-
ernment functions must remain private. Thus, while finding that the 
public has a right to receive information about the courts (places that 
have always been open to the public) the Supreme Court has expressly 
limited its findings to this context:  
To this I would add a further caveat. I do not accept that the necessary 
consequence of recognizing the importance of public access to the courts 
is the recognition of public access to all facets of public institutions. The 
Intervener, Attorney General for Saskatchewan argues that if an open 
court system is to be protected under s. 2(b) of the Charter on the basis 
that the public has an entitlement to information about proceedings in the 
criminal courts, then all venues within which the criminal law is 
administered will have to be accessible to the public, including jury 
rooms, a trial judge’s chambers and the conference rooms of appellate 
courts. The fallacy with this argument is that it ignores the fundamental 
distinction between the criminal courts, the subject of this appeal, and 
the other venues mentioned by the Intervener. Courts are and have, since 
time immemorial, been public arenas. The same cannot be said of these 
other venues. Thus, to argue that constitutional protection should be 
extended to public access to these private places, on the basis that public 
access to the courts is constitutionally protected, is untenable.64 
(d) Conclusion on a Right to Information and Section 2(b) of the Charter 
Ontario’s arguments that section 2(b) did not support a finding that it 
included any right to information were rejected by the Court without 
much analysis. That being said, many of those arguments seem to have 
informed the strict test developed by the Court for the new limited right 
to government information.65 As examined below, as the test is currently 
constituted, the right to information in section 2(b) is very narrow, thus 
raising questions as to the practical significance of the newly created 
right.  
                                                                                                             
63 Id., at para. 79 (emphasis added). 
64 Canadian Broadcasting Corp. v. New Brunswick (Attorney General), [1996] S.C.J. No. 
38, [1996] 3 S.C.R. 480, at para. 28 (S.C.C.) (emphasis added). 
65 For example, Ontario’s argument that a right to information would affect the effective 
operation of government institutions by removing privacy seems to have found a place in the coun-
tervailing interest part of the new test.  
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2. The Practical Significance of the Newly Created Right to  
Government Information 
The decision in Criminal Lawyers is an important one as it estab-
lishes a new right to government information located in section 2(b) of 
the Charter. However, on a practical level, the new right may not have 
much application. As examined below, the right to government informa-
tion established by the Court in section 2(b) is an extremely narrow one. 
This lies in contrast to the general approach in section 2(b) cases, where 
claimants often sail through section 2(b) and the real battle is the ques-
tion of whether the section 2(b) infringement is satisfied under Charter 
section 1.  
The test to determine whether section 2(b) is engaged by a denial of 
access to government information has two components. First, a claimant 
has the burden of demonstrating that access to information is necessary in 
order for the claimant to meaningfully comment on an issue of public im-
portance. Second, even where a prima facie case is made out, the claimant 
must also demonstrate that there is no “countervailing interest” — specifi-
cally that access to the information sought would not impinge on a 
privilege or impair the proper functioning of government institutions.  
In my view, this test will seldom be met. First, in many cases, like 
the Criminal Lawyers case itself, the claimant will be unable to demon-
strate that without the information there cannot be meaningful 
expression. In Criminal Lawyers, the CLA argued that it could not mean-
ingfully comment on whether there was a cover-up of the botched 
murder investigation and trial without seeing the report investigating the 
police and attorneys involved in that trial. It is difficult to see how an-
other claimant could demonstrate that this step of the test is satisfied in 
his or her case when the CLA was unsuccessful in doing so in this case.  
Second, the “countervailing interests” test is very broad, and will in 
many cases dictate that a failure to disclose results in no infringement 
regardless of whether the information is necessary for meaningful com-
ment. The “countervailing interests” test can be invoked to justify the 
non-disclosure of any document covered by “privilege”. Moreover, any 
claimant who can satisfy the test for a prima facie case and survives the 
privilege test will also have to pass the second part of the countervailing 
interest test — the “government function” test.  
The exemption for privileged documents is a broad one. In explain-
ing why this component of the test was included, the Court stated as 
follows:  
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Privileges are recognized as appropriate derogations from the scope of 
the protection offered by s. 2(b) of the Charter. The common law 
privileges, like solicitor-client privilege, generally represent situations 
where the public interest in confidentiality outweighs the interests 
served by disclosure. This is also the rationale behind common law 
privileges that have been cast in statutory form, like the privilege 
relating to confidences of the Queen’s Privy Council under s. 39 of the 
Canada Evidence Act, R.S.C. 1985, c. C-5.66  
Commonly accepted privileges include solicitor-client privilege and 
litigation privilege (both found in section 19 of FIPPA) as well as cabinet 
privilege (section 12 of FIPPA). The scope of the word “privilege” as 
used in the new test to access information is certainly wider than the 
above three privileges. For example, the Court’s judgment expressly rec-
ognizes a “law enforcement privilege” set out in section 14.67  
Given the court’s decision on the facts of Criminal Lawyers and, in 
particular, its recognition that privileges may be in statutory form, argua-
bly the denial of access to any document on the basis that it is covered by 
one of the exemptions in FIPPA (sections 12 to 22) would take that de-
nial out of the scope of section 2(b). Interestingly, the Court went on to 
say that direct challenges to a statutory provision allowing for the non-
disclosure of documents, while of course possible, would rarely be suc-
cessful as the presence of a privilege would likely be found to remove 
section 2(b) protection. The Court stated that while “assertions of par-
ticular categories of privilege are in principle open to constitutional 
challenge”, “in practice, the outlines of these privileges are likely to be 
well-settled, providing predictability and certainty to what must be pro-
duced and what remains protected”. Governments responding to section 
2(b) challenges to privileges in statutory form will be able to rely on this 
particular passage from the Court.  
The final component of the countervailing interest test — the “gov-
ernment function exclusion” — is also potentially very broad. The Court 
pointed to two examples where this exemption could be relied on to illus-
trate that the disclosure of some types of information, such as judicial 
notes or Cabinet confidences, will obviously interfere with the effective 
functioning of a government institution. In other cases where it is not 
immediately obvious, the historic functioning of a place should be 
                                                                                                             
66 Supra, note 1, at para. 39. 
67 For example see id., at para. 29. The French version of the judgment also suggests that 
the term “privilege” (“privilège” in French) includes statutory exemptions like the law enforcement 
privilege.  
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looked at to see if disclosure would interfere with the effective operation 
of the institution.68  
Finally, as in the Criminal Lawyers case itself, even where there is a 
prima facie case that is not caught by the countervailing interest test, it is 
open to the government to argue that the claimant has not demonstrated 
that it is the state that has infringed the section 2(b) protection. In Criminal 
Lawyers the Court found that, properly interpreted, sections 14 and 19 al-
ready required the government to consider the public interest when 
exercising its discretion under these sections. Thus, on a practical level, the 
remedy sought by the CLA — reading sections 14 and 19 into section 23 
— would have little effect on the ability of the CLA to obtain documents. 
In sum, the limits on the new right to government held information 
are strict. In my opinion, it will only be the rarest of cases where a claim-
ant can demonstrate that the denial of a request for information will  
infringe section 2(b) of the Charter. 
3. The Irwin Toy/City of Montreal Test under Section 2(b) of the 
Charter  
The Criminal Lawyers decision is important not simply because the 
Court recognized a new right to information in section 2(b) of the Charter 
but also because of the way it went about doing so. Below, I examine two 
aspects of that process. First, the Court was able to locate a right to gov-
ernment information in section 2(b) because it was able to find, contrary to 
the submissions of Ontario, that the first step of Irwin Toy was not a theo-
retical bar to a successful claim for information under section 2(b). 
Second, in recognizing a limited right to information, the Court imposed a 
positive obligation on government without applying the Dunmore/Baier 
                                                                                                             
68 The Court stated, id., at para. 40: 
It may also be that a particular government function is incompatible with access to certain 
documents. For example, it might be argued that while the open court principle requires 
that court hearings and judgments be open and available for public scrutiny and com-
ment, memos and notes leading to a judicial decision are not subject to public access. 
This would impair the proper functioning of the court by preventing full and frank delib-
eration and discussion at the pre-judgment stage. The principle of Cabinet confidence for 
internal government discussions offers another example. The historic function of a par-
ticular institution may assist in determining the bounds of institutional confidentiality, as 
discussed in Montréal (City), at para. 22. In that case, this Court acknowledged that cer-
tain government functions and activities require privacy (para. 76). This applies to 
demands for access to information in government hands. Certain types of documents may 
remain exempt from disclosure because disclosure would impact the proper functioning 
of affected institutions. 
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test previously developed for such claims. Both of these decisions bear 
comment. 
(a) The Application of the First Step of Irwin Toy to a Request for  
Government-Held Information  
Ontario argued at the Supreme Court of Canada that regardless of 
whether the Court found that the Dunmore/Baier test applied to a denial 
of a request for information, there was no section 2(b) breach because the 
first step of Irwin Toy had not been satisfied. That initial question re-
quires the claimant to demonstrate that the activity it is engaged in is an 
“expressive activity”. Ontario argued that that step was not satisfied 
where the impugned state action was a denial of a request for information 
because a request for government held information was not an “expres-
sive activity”. Any comments the CLA made regarding the discrepancy 
between the findings of Glithero J. and the OPP investigation, its request 
for access to information, and its complaints about the government’s re-
fusal to disclose that information would be expressive activity. However, 
there was no suggestion that the government has done anything to restrict 
that expressive activity. While everyone, including the CLA, has a pro-
tected right to speak to government (including the right to request 
information), there is no correlative Charter right to an answer from gov-
ernment, or to be provided with material on which to comment.  
In making that submission, Ontario acknowledged that the protection 
given by section 2(b) — the freedom of expression — which includes the 
right to “express thoughts into words” or other means of expression, 
guarantees the right to be free to express “information already in the pos-
session of the person seeking to express it” and also guarantees a 
listener’s right to hear words spoken freely. However, Ontario argued 
that the freedom of expression does not guarantee the right to a dialogue, 
or the right to force others to provide the content for expression.  
In response, the CLA’s position was that it had satisfied the first step 
of Irwin Toy. It argued that the comments it would make if it had access 
to the requested information constitute its expressive activity. This argu-
ment was successful at the Divisional Court, which found that the 
expressive activity at issue is the CLA’s “desire to comment publicly” on 
the discrepancy between Glithero J.’s findings and the OPP’s conclu-
sion.69  
                                                                                                             
69 Supra, note 21, at para. 55. 
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The CLA argument was also successful at the Court of Appeal. The 
majority of the Court of Appeal characterized the expressive activity in 
issue as “the potential comments the CLA would make should it receive 
the requested information”.70 However, the dissent, in careful reasons, 
found that the first step of Irwin Toy had not been met. While expressly 
stating that “one should take an expansive view of what is ‘expressive 
activity’”,71 Juriansz J.A. concluded that “in this case there is no expres-
sive activity at issue. The CLA cannot escape the fact that its real 
complaint is that the government failed to disclose information to it to 
facilitate its proposed expression.”72 Justice Juriansz’s decision is impor-
tant because as explored below, he found that to find there was 
expressive activity in this case would do damage to the integrity of the 
Irwin Toy framework.  
Justice Juriansz’s decision began by considering the purpose of the 
two-stage test developed in Irwin Toy. He began by describing the impor-
tance of keeping the two steps of the Irwin Toy test distinct, stating as 
follows: 
The two steps of Irwin Toy are analytically distinct. Each step serves a 
different purpose and each has its own distinct focus. The first step 
focuses on the person claiming the protection of s. 2(b). It examines a 
person’s activity in order to determine whether that activity prima facie 
falls within the scope of guaranteed free expression. At step one, the 
challenged government action is not relevant. The second step focuses 
on the challenged government action in order to determine whether its 
purpose or effect is to restrict freedom of expression.73  
Justice Juriansz concluded that “the situation the CLA finds itself in 
— having the ‘desire to comment’ and having ‘potential comments’ — is 
not, in my view, expressive activity. It is, rather, the effect of the govern-
ment’s refusal to disclose information”.74 Importantly, he noted that the 
effect of the government’s action was not relevant at step one of the Ir-
win Toy analysis because “that focuses on the activity of the claimant. 
The effect of the government’s refusal does not come into play until step 
two of the Irwin Toy analysis is reached”.75 
                                                                                                             
70 Supra, note 3, at para. 30. 
71 Id., at para. 151. 
72 Id. 
73 Id., at para. 146. 
74 Id., at para. 148 (emphasis in original). 
75 Id. 
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Justice Juriansz’s decision recognizes that the CLA did not engage in 
expressive activity upon receiving notice of the government’s refusal to 
disclose the requested information. Rather, receipt of the requested in-
formation was a necessary but not sufficient precondition for the CLA’s 
potential expressive activity. As he stated, “without it, there is no expres-
sive activity”.76 Similarly, even with the report, there could be no 
expressive activity as it was possible that the CLA might decide not to 
make any comment on the report. In Juriansz J.A.’s words, “the govern-
ment’s act of refusing to disclose the information cannot, following the 
Irwin Toy analysis, create expressive activity where none existed”.77  
In its factum and oral argument, Ontario relied heavily on Juriansz 
J.A.’s dissent to argue that no right of information could be found in sec-
tion 2(b) because the first step of Irwin Toy had not been satisfied. In 
Ontario’s view, this was a significant issue in the case, because if On-
tario’s position was accepted, it would have completely closed the door 
to any section 2(b) infringement for a request of information. Unfortu-
nately, the Supreme Court did not engage in any analysis of this issue. In 
one sentence, it came to the conclusion that whether the denial of a re-
quest for information was an expressive activity could only be answered 
on a case-by-case basis, after consideration of all of the circumstances of 
the case: 
To demonstrate that there is expressive content [i.e., to show that the 
first step of Irwin Toy is satisfied] in accessing such documents, the 
claimant must establish that the denial of access effectively precludes 
meaningful commentary.78  
With respect, the Supreme Court’s conclusion is open to the criticism 
that it fails to keep the steps of the Irwin Toy test distinct. As had been 
eloquently reasoned by Juriansz J.A. in his dissent in the court below: 
To use the effect of the government’s decision to characterize the 
CLA’s situation as “expressive activity” is to conflate steps one and 
two of the Irwin Toy analysis. If the restrictive effect of the 
government’s refusal is the basis for recognizing the CLA’s “potential 
comments” or “desire to comment” as expressive activity at step one, 
then the same refusal will, by definition, have the effect of restricting 
expression at [the final] step … The same question will have been 
                                                                                                             
76 Id., at para. 149. 
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78 Supra, note 1, at para. 33. 
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asked and answered at both steps. Clearly, there is a problem with the 
way the CLA advocates applying the Irwin Toy analysis.79  
In my view, the Supreme Court’s decision to dismiss Ontario’s ar-
gument without analysis was an unfortunate one. It is clear from the 
Court’s decision on this issue that it was not prepared to hold that the 
Charter does not protect any right to government held information.  
That being said, the Court seems to have taken Ontario’s submission 
to heart (albeit not in the form requested by Ontario). By requiring a 
claimant to demonstrate a prima facie case (i.e., that the denial of access 
in their particular case precludes meaningful expression), the Court has 
recognized that the denial of most requests for information will not “pre-
clude meaningful commentary” on issues of public importance. Thus, the 
vast majority of requests will be filtered out under the first step of the test 
created by the Court because a claimant will not be able to demonstrate 
that its request for information amounts to an “expressive activity” (i.e., 
will fail to show that denying access precludes meaningful commentary). 
While not the complete bar argued for by Ontario, the combination of the 
requirements of the prima facie case and the “countervailing interests” 
test, will make it difficult for a claimant to establish that a denial of in-
formation engages section 2(b) of the Charter.  
(b) The Decision of the Court Not to Apply the Dunmore/Baier Test 
In Criminal Lawyers, the Supreme Court placed a constitutional bur-
den on government to act proactively (e.g., by requiring the government 
to disclose information, albeit in limited circumstances) without having 
applied the Dunmore/Baier analysis.80 The implications of the decision 
of the Court to impose a positive obligation by reformulating the Irwin 
Toy test rather than applying the Dunmore test is explored below.  
(i) The Dunmore/Baier Test  
In Baier, the Supreme Court reaffirmed that it would require excep-
tional circumstances for section 2(b) of the Charter to require positive 
                                                                                                             
79 Supra, note 3, at para. 149. 
80 At the Supreme Court, Ontario argued inter alia that the government’s refusal to disclose 
a police report and solicitor-client privileged information did not infringe freedom of expression 
because s. 2(b) of the Charter does not generally impose a positive obligation on government and the 
facts of Criminal Lawyers did not meet the stringent test for an exception to that general rule, laid 
out in Dunmore and Baier. 
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government action. In that case, the Court rejected the claimant’s argu-
ment that section 2(b) includes a positive right to the statutory platform 
of school trusteeship to assist expression.81 The Supreme Court reaf-
firmed that to depart from the general rule that section 2 imposes only 
negative obligations on government, would require exceptional circum-
stances that meet the three factors identified previously by the Court in 
Dunmore. The Court explained: “In cases where a government defending 
a Charter challenge alleges, or the Charter claimant concedes, that a 
positive rights claim is being made under s. 2(b), a court must proceed in 
the following way”:  
First it must consider whether the activity for which the claimant seeks 
s. 2(b) protection is a form of expression. If so, then second, the court 
must determine if the claimant claims a positive entitlement to 
government action, or simply the right to be free from government 
interference. If it is a positive rights claim, then third, the three 
Dunmore factors must be considered.82  
The Court went on to summarize the three Dunmore factors that must 
be met before a positive rights claim under section 2(b) can succeed:  
… these three factors are (1) that the claim is grounded in a 
fundamental freedom of expression rather than in access to a particular 
statutory regime; (2) that the claimant has demonstrated that exclusion 
from a statutory regime has the effect of a substantial interference with 
s. 2(b) freedom of expression, or has the purpose of infringing freedom 
of expression under s. 2(b); and (3) that the government is responsible 
for the inability to exercise the fundamental freedom. If the claimant 
cannot satisfy these criteria then the s. 2(b) claim will fail. If the three 
factors are satisfied then s. 2(b) has been infringed and the analysis will 
shift to s. 1.83  
(ii) The Relevance of the Dunmore/Baier Test to a Right to  
Government-Held Information 
At the Supreme Court, Ontario argued that the Dunmore/Baier 
analysis applied because the claimants sought a positive entitlement to 
government action rather than the right to be free from government inter-
ference (i.e., the claimants seek a positive right to compel the disclosure 
of government held information rather than freedom from any prohibi-
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tion on their own conduct). The CLA argued it was seeking only a nega-
tive right to be free from government interference with expression and 
therefore that the Dunmore/Baier test did not apply. The majority of the 
Court of Appeal never considered this argument.84 The dissent carefully 
considered the issue and found that indeed what was being sought was a 
positive right and not to be free from negative interference. Somewhat 
surprisingly, the Supreme Court did not answer this fundamental issue in 
any detail. It simply stated the following: 
Determining whether s. 2(b) of the Charter requires access to 
documents in government hands in a particular case is essentially a 
question of how far s. 2(b) protection extends. A question arises as to 
how the issue should be approached. The courts below were divided on 
whether the analysis should follow the model adopted in Dunmore v. 
Ontario (Attorney General), 2001 SCC 94, [2001] 3 S.C.R. 1016. In 
their argument before this Court, [Ontario] placed reliance on Dunmore 
and on this Court’s subsequent decision in Baier v. Alberta, 2007 SCC 
31, [2007] 2 S.C.R. 673. In our view, nothing would be gained by 
furthering this debate. Rather, it is our view that the question of access 
to government information is best approached by building on the 
methodology set in Irwin Toy Ltd. v. Quebec (Attorney General), 
[1989] 1 S.C.R. 927, at pp. 967-68, and in Montréal (City) v. 2952-
1366 Québec Inc., 2005 SCC 62, [2005] 3 S.C.R. 141). The main 
question in this case is whether s. 2(b) is engaged at all. We conclude 
that the scope of the s. 2(b) protection includes a right to access to 
documents only where access is necessary to permit meaningful 
discussion on a matter of public importance, subject to privileges and 
functional constraints.85 
The Court’s decision to impose a duty on government to disclose in-
formation, albeit in limited circumstances, without finding the 
Dunmore/Baier test was satisfied, and with little explanation, is very  
                                                                                                             
84 In Baier, the Supreme Court rejected the argument that what was being requested was not 
a positive entitlement to government action and specifically recognized that using a statute as the 
foundation against which to find “government interference” conflates statutory and constitutional 
rights, with the effect of constitutionalizing a statutory regime. See Baier, supra, note 31, at paras. 
35-42. The relevant question is whether the claimant seeks a Charter entitlement to positive govern-
ment action rather than a right to be free from government interference. Thus, that FIPPA may 
establish statutory rights is irrelevant to the positive nature of CLA’s claim that s. 2(b) requires the 
government to take the positive step of providing records.  
85 Supra, note 1, at para. 31 (emphasis added). 
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peculiar.86 Ontario argued that Dunmore/Baier applied and that in par-
ticular, the first Dunmore factor would preclude a request for information 
ever satisfying the test to require positive government action.87 That is 
because, as argued by Ontario, a claim for information is a claim to ac-
cess a statutory regime and is not grounded in freedom of expression. In 
my view, this argument would have been very strong. Perhaps the deci-
sion not to apply Dunmore/Baier can be explained as follows: not 
wanting to shut the door completely on a right to government informa-
tion, and not wanting to dilute the Dunmore/Baier framework for future 
“positive rights” cases, the Supreme Court was forced to come up with 
an alternative framework for analysis.  
In my view, it is unlikely that the Supreme Court’s decision not to ap-
ply the Dunmore/Baier test in Criminal Lawyers will impact future 
challenges which seek to impose positive obligations on the state. In this 
regard, the Criminal Lawyers case will not be viewed in future cases as a 
“platform” case by the Supreme Court but as a case that is sui generis in 
nature. The case can be distinguished from Haig, NWAC, Delisle and Baier 
on the basis that what was sought in Criminal Lawyers was government 
information, which cannot (according to the Court) be equated to the ac-
cess to platforms for expression sought in the other four cases. Thus in my 
view, the Criminal Lawyers case does not change the analytical framework 
in cases where what is sought is positive government action. Indeed, the 
Court’s choice of language in deciding not to turn to the Dunmore/Baier 
framework does not indicate a repudiation of the test in the context of a 
claim to positive state action. Where what is sought is access to a statutory 
platform for expression (or access to a statutory labour relations regime in 
the context of section 2(d) cases) Dunmore/Baier will continue to apply. 
VIII. CONCLUSION 
For the first time, the Supreme Court has held that section 2(b) of the 
Charter includes a right to government-held information, albeit in limited 
circumstances. The Court found that section 2(b) includes a right to ac-
cess to documents “where access is necessary to permit meaningful 
                                                                                                             
86 Compare with the considered analysis of this issue in Greater Vancouver Transportation 
Authority v. Canadian Federation of Students — British Columbia Component, [2009] S.C.J. No. 31, 
2009 SCC 31, [2009] 2 S.C.R. 295, at paras. 25-36 (S.C.C.).  
87 Ontario also argued (a) that it would be a rare denial of information that would satisfy the 
second Dunmore factor or “substantial impairment” test; and (b) that the third Dunmore factor was 
not met because it was not the state that was the source of the infringement.  
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discussion on a matter of public importance, subject to privileges and 
functional constraints”.88 
It remains to be seen how the test established by the Supreme Court 
will be applied by lower courts. As discussed in this paper, it is my opin-
ion that it will be a rare denial of a request for information that will 
satisfy the Criminal Lawyers test for a section 2(b) infringement. In addi-
tion, in the rare case where a claimant is able to demonstrate a prima 
facie case and establish that disclosure would not impair a privilege or 
the effective operation of a government institution, the government may 
be able to invoke section 1 to justify non-disclosure.  
While the CLA and media and other interveners would like to have 
seen a more robust right, the gains made in the Criminal Lawyers case 
are not insubstantial. The fact remains that it is now theoretically possi-
ble to use section 2(b) of the Charter to require government to disclose 
information. The recognition of a new Charter right to information will 
cause all governments to carefully consider the constitutional validity of 
the provisions of their existing access legislation and proceed cautiously 
with any amendments that reduce access.  
Finally, the emphasis in the Criminal Lawyers decision on the impor-
tance of the proper exercise of discretion is important. In my view, the 
Court’s focus on the proper exercise of discretion is a signal to govern-
ment that discretionary decisions refusing to disclose information will be 
carefully reviewed by information commissioners and courts on adminis-
trative law grounds. Paramount in the exercise of the discretion is 
whether the public interest outweighs the purpose of an exemption, and a 
government that fails to provide adequate reasons for non-disclosure can 
expect to be asked to justify the exercise of discretion upon judicial  
review. The Court’s direction on this issue is entirely consistent with On-
tario’s main purpose in enacting FIPPA: that government information 
should be available to the public except where a countervailing interest 
justifies a decision to resist disclosure for the greater public good. 
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